















Our discussion in the first five sections shows that little new can be said about compatibilism, that van Inwagen's argument for incompatibilism still stands, and that the view of free agency for a libertarian has little chance unless she believes that agency contains elements that are not within the natural order.  Borrowing from a suggestion from Russell we expanded the Nozick-Kane model of libertarian free agency and connected it to the Wignerian interpretation of quantum measurement.  As such, free decisions and choices may well violate the Born rule of probability distribution and yet it is shown how such violations are unlikely to be detected in experiments.  This model is probably the only model in which Loewer's van Inwagen style argument for the incompatibility between free agency and quantum indeterminism does not apply, and it is a model in which free agency is not only compatible but necessary.  It is compatible with indeterminism and it is necessary for the determinateness of any measurement outcomes.

I. On Frankfurt-type cases and ceteris paribus laws
For the sake of later discussion, let me refresh our memory of van Inwagen's main argument against compatibilism in a simple example.  Suppose there is a very simple world, D, in which there are five objects.  Physically they can hardly be distinguished from one another and they are no different from perfectly solid (and rigid) pebbles in our world; but one of them has the mental capacity of an ordinary person.​[1]​  D may be strange but it is certainly a possible world, and because it is physically so simple only the deterministic (or Newtonian) laws of motion and gravity need to be considered.  The intelligent pebble, let us call it Shiren, reports that he can entertain alternative possible directions and/or ways he wants to move in D and can even make decisions about which direction and/or way he wants, but if he has a clear understanding of his predicament, which he must have because he has an ordinary intelligence by our standard and his predicament is extremely simple, he will know that none of his acts can be regarded as free even if he fully feels that some of his moves are the result of his decisions.  His reasoning is likely to go as follows.  

If D, my universe, is deterministic, which seems obviously true, the law and some event E in the past entails that I moved in a certain direction B at time t.  If I had moved in a different direction B' at time t, I would have made 'moving in direction B at time t' false.  That implies I would have made either the law false or E otherwise.  No one can change the past, so it is not possible for me to have made E otherwise; therefore, I would have made the law false.  But no one can made a law of physics false; therefore, I could not have moved in direction B' at time t.  Hence, by reason against absurdity, if determinism is true in D, I could not have moved in a different direction than I was determined to move.​[2]​

The restriction 'in D' in the last sentence can be removed and a similar argument can be made for any possible world that is deterministic in the sense that the laws and any event in that world together determine uniquely any other events in it.  And this is essentially van Inwagen's argument (van Inwagen 1983, ch. III).  
The basic assumptions for the argument can be stated roughly as follows.

(1) Free actions (that ground moral responsibility) requires the possibility of real alternatives.
(2) It is not possible to change the past.
(3) It is not possible to violate the laws.

There is a large literature debating the necessity of (1); and the most prominent line is what is known as the Frankfurt-type cases against the “principle of alternative possibilities (PAP)” (cf. Kane 2002, part V.)  The point that is common to all the cases is simply this: because one can imagine cases - situations where clever devices are inserted at the right places to eliminate, without the agent's awareness, the relevant alternative possibilities required according to assumption (1) for free decisions - where an agent has obviously made a decision to act in a way that he should be held responsible and yet for him no relevant alternatives exist regarding his decision.  
I shall not engage the debate here but ask the following question: do Frankfurt-type cases provide counterexamples to van Inwagen's argument?  Van Inwagen certainly does not think so (cf. Van Inwagen (1983) pp. 162-182).  His argument as sketched above is for the incompatibility of free will and determinism; it does not say anything about what is necessary for an agent to be held responsible for her actions.  Although he believes that to be morally responsible for one's act one must be able not to have carried it out or carried it out differently - and he has arguments for this claim - he concedes that the Frankfurt-type cases make a forceful and appealing rejection to it.  If the Frankfurt-type cases are indeed successful, we must admit that one can be morally responsible for one's actions without one's being able to have done otherwise.  This means for van Inwagen that one can be held responsible for acts that one has not done freely or, in other words, one does not need freedom of will to be responsible for one's own actions.  
This take on the implication of the Frankfurt-type cases, obviously preferred by van van Inwagen, is problematic, to say the least.  First, because the agents in most of the Frankfurt-type cases are unaware of the existence of the devices that eliminate their freedom of choice, they made their decision as if they were entirely free.  If we compare the actual decision trajectory of a Frankfurt agent with the trajectory of a similar agent who is exactly alike but without a Frankfurt-type device, there is no discernable difference between the two.  Hence, if the latter agent can be said to have freely chosen his action, there is no reason for us to say that the Frankfurt agent has not, despite the fact that all the alternative possibilities are removed by the implemented device.  And it is this 'free choice' without alternative possibilities that makes it plausible for us to attribute moral responsibility to the agent's action.  Second, the two positions, hard determinism and compatibilism are not the negation of each other.  Hard determinism is the position that says if determinism is true, there is no free will (no actions are chosen freely) and hence no one is morally responsible for one's actions, while compatibilism says that even if determinism is true, there could be free will and hence one can be morally responsible for one's actions.  The Frankfurt-cases arguments are aimed at vindicating compatibilism; they are not aimed simply at refuting hard determinism (i.e. even if determinism is true, agents are still morally responsible for all of their actions).  If van Inwagen's interpretation is correct, the latter would have to be the sole purpose of the Frankfurt-type cases.  Third, the common sense belief that we cannot be morally responsible for all of our actions must be kept whatever our view on free will is; but if determinism is true, all actions are without alternative possibilities.  What distinguishes those actions we are responsible from those we are not, despite the lack of alternative possibilities?  It must be something that we judge as having been chosen by us rather than having us been coerced into doing them.  This distinction does not exist unless Frankfurt and company are right that there are free choices without genuine alternative possibilities.  Therefore, van Inwagen's interpretation is seriously flawed.  
If this is so, the answer to my initial question: do Frankfurt-type cases provide counterexamples to van Iwagen's argument should be a 'Yes.'  There are freely decided actions for which the agents involved are morally responsible if Frankfurt and his supporters are right, and if so, van Inwagen's argument for incompatibilism is unsound.  However, I am yet to be convinced that Frankfurt and his supporters are right, which is a controversy I shall not touch here.  The above is a critique of van Inwagen's take on the implication of Frankfurt-type cases only.

Let me return to the main track after this short detour.  Assumption (2) is impossible to assail or at least much more difficult to assail than any other assumptions or claims in the whole debate.  Even if one can travel back in time, one has to make sure that such journeys change nothing in the past (cf. Lewis 1986, p.67ff); in fact this is part of the consistency condition that makes time travel possible.​[3]​  Hence the assumption must be left alone.  
Before we consider the possibility of (3) let us consider the following question: could a natural system's complexity, and perhaps some emergent properties in it, make sense of our control over our decision-making processes and actions even if determinism is true?  To answer this question, we need to see whether it is true that as we conceptually increase the complexity of a simple possible universe (with the aim of making it more and more resemble our universe as we now know it) whether certain “rooms” or “spaces” open up so that the determinism becomes less stringent.   
Let us first make a simple Newtonian universe more complex by adding a large number of similar particles - as large a number as one wants.  It's obvious that the determinism remains the same as long as their behavior is similarly governed only by Newton's laws of motion and gravitation.  Next let us give the particles more properties, such as electric charges, such that a new force of interaction and a new law of electromagnetism are introduced to the universe.  If the law of electromagnetism is as deterministic as the law of gravity, we do not seem to have any reason to suspect that the nature of determinism is changed.  The state of this enriched universe is simply defined as the positions and momenta of all the particles and any state at any time is completely determined when the state at another time is given together with the three laws (of motion, of gravity, and of electromagnetism) in the same rigorous sense of entailment (or derivability) as given above.  This recipe, or any straightforward variation of it, of making a universe more complex can obviously be repeated as many times as one likes so that the resulting universe looks more and more like the actual world.  Notice, the recipe is entirely general and extremely flexible: the denizen of the universe can be physical objects of any kind of (finite) sizes and shapes and possessing any number of properties - mass, charge, properties describable in chemistry, geology, biology, or psychology.  Prima facie, as long as the instantiations of these properties in the objects together completely define the state of the universe and the values of these properties change strictly according to deterministic laws, the nature of determinism will remain the same as the strict determinism in the simplest world with which we begin, if determinism holds at all.  
 I begin the previous sentence with “Prima facie,” but is it in fact true?  One can think of different ways to challenge the claim, and one of which is to appeal to the ceteris paribus nature of laws (and regularities)  Let us suppose for the sake of simplicity that laws of nature have the logical form:

(4) All Fs are Gs,

where F stands for one property and G another.  For instance, Newton's law of gravity can be put into this form by saying roughly “all objects with mass are objects that attract one another with the force of gravity that is expressed in the equation __.”  A subclass of laws may however be better represented by a variation of the above form: 

(5) Whenever X happens at t, Y happens at t*, t*≥t,

where X and Y are two distinct sets of events (including the singletons) and t and t* two instants in time.  A degenerate form of both types of laws are known in the literature as the ‘ceteris paribus laws’ because they are said not to be true by themselves but true ’when all other things - most of which are unaccounted for - are equal.’  Such laws, if they can be regarded as laws of nature at all, are most frequently seen in disciplines of science that deal with complex phenomena (think of evolutionary biology and sociology).  It therefore may seem reasonable, nay even natural, to conclude that in a world as complex as ours there are laws of this kind, and if so, the determinism in our world is a ‘softer,’ less strict kind of determinism.  But can the notion of ceteris paribus laws create some degree of freedom for options or choice in which we reconcile determinism and free will?  
Many generalizations we encounter are of the following kind.  Eating amount X of carbohydrate makes you fat.  Playing amount Y of violent videogames in adolescence makes someone commit a violent crime in his adulthood.  Throwing a lighted match to a heap of dry grass ignites it.  Brushing your teeth twice a day, every day, prevents cavities in your mouth.  We all know that these and others similar to these are not always true; they admit exceptions.  To make them true, we can always say this: all things being equal, eating this much carbohydrate will make you fat; all thing being equal, brushing your teeth twice a day, every day, will prevent cavities in your mouth; and so on.  The reason behind our doing this is the following simple fact.  For every person at any time, eating amount X of carbohydrate will either make him fat or it will not make him fat.  Separate the people (and their circumstances when they consume a lot of sugary stuff) into two classes: those who get fat and those who do not.  Then we say the statement ‘eating amount X of carbohydrate will make you fat’ must be true to those cases where the circumstances are exactly the same as the people who get fat (or the intersection of their circumstances) (hence the phrase ‘all things being equal’).  The statement, which is purportedly about a law of nature, is therefore made true; but unless we know exactly what those circumstances are that must be kept the same we do not really know what the statement says.  Notice, it is not that the statement says something vague or imprecise; no, it is precise because ‘all things’ refers to those and only those circumstances that guarantee the truth of the statement.  When all circumstances - whatever they are - are held equal, everyone who eats amount X of carbohydrate will get fat.​[4]​  But we do not know in most of such cases what is said by the statement, because we do not know what are the things that ‘all things’ refer to.  
Because of this subtle difference between what is said by a ceteris paribus law-statement and what we can know about what is said there, I do not believe that even if the laws of nature in our world include ceteris paribus ‘laws,‘ the determinism we have is any less strict.  If our world is deterministic, it entails that for every ceteris paribus law the circumstances that the ‘all things being equal’ phrase refers to are well-defined and determined in a logical sense.  We may not and never know what they are, but as far as the laws governing the behavior of the objects in our universe are concerned, the grip is just as strict as the laws that do not have the ceteris paribus clause.  To put this matter in another way.  Suppose there is an omniscient being who knows all circumstances at all time.  For him there are no ceteris paribus laws or such laws are not necessary for him because the above-mentioned difference between what is said and what can be known in a ceteris paribus law-statement does not apply to him.  He knows whatever is said about our universe.  Is it not obvious that how strict a determinism our world has is not determined by us, who are ignorant of many things, but by him who is omniscient?  
Moreover, even if our determinism is less strict because of the ceteris paribus nature of some of the laws, it will not help in giving us a place for free will.  What makes such laws govern less strictly is that the ‘law‘ fails to hold when the circumstances are presumably not all the same.  One may think that a free agent may be able to exploit such a situation in the sense that he can exert control over his choice in those circumstances in which the grip of the ‘law’ in question is absent.  But this can never happen if the laws are truly ceteris paribus because there is a dilemma: if an ordinary agent is able to know when the law holds and when it has exceptions then the law is no longer ceteris paribus for him, such as it could never be to an omniscient being, or if the law is truly ceteris paribus to the agent then whatever room it creates is no use to him.  Hence, even if an agent tries to explore the situation, his effort can only succeed by chance; and that is opposite to what we take as evidence of his free agency.  We are now back to that dilemma for free will that threatens to exclude it whether or not the world is deterministic.  Hard incompatibilists (cf. Pereboom 2001) have compellingly argued that if the world is deterministic, it has no place for free will; but if the world is indeterministic, it has no place for free will either because what happens in such a world happens by shear chance, and chance is perhaps more incompatible with control or choice of free agency.  So, to open the world, so to speak, to a softer determinism by evoking the notion of ceteris paribus laws does not work.
However, our recipe I described above can produce a logically possible world in which there is an opening.  To a world (/universe) that either has an infinite number of inhabitants or has inhabitants that have an infinite number of properties, determinism may have to loosen its grip.  In this world ceteris paribus laws, if there are such, are by default open-ended laws, because the ‘all things being equal’ clause truly refers to an undeterminable set of circumstances that are not merely unknowable to us but unknowable to an omniscient being or unknowable in principle.  But on the other hand, open-endedness is the least problem for such a world; an infinite world is difficult to deal with conceptually unless some restrictions are implemented.  Strictly speaking one cannot even define a state of this universe at any instant of time because it would involve an infinite number of numbers, which is not a determinant.  Because of that one can not conceive of laws in that world in any ordinary sense, i.e. in terms of nomological connections among states.  The most natural restriction one would assume if one has to deal with such a universe is a segregation condition of some sort.  If this universe can be roughly divided into two parts, one populated and the rest almost empty, then we can just deal with the populated part and ignore for all practical purposes the rest.  If one thinks that our world is such an infinite universe and the laws governing the populated part in which we inhabit are all strictly deterministic, then the rare intrusion of things from the nearly vacuous part that is the rest of our universe may serve to loosen the grip of this determinism.  This seems reasonable but again it does nothing to help us rehabilitate the compatibility between determinism and free will, because whatever model one conceives in the attempt to bridge such occasional intrusions from the outside with the incidents of free decision is bound to appear implausible if not downright ridiculous.  
To summarize, the existence of ceteris paribus laws in a world by itself does not make it less deterministic, and even if the world is less deterministic (than the simplest possible world with only two particles and Newton's laws), because for example that it is infinite in some sense, the ‘softer’ determinism would not provide any room for free will to make compatibilism more plausible.  

II. How violating laws, if possible, makes room for freedom
We agree as most do that we cannot change the past.  What happened cannot be changed even if one can travel back in time.  But can we violate laws of nature?  And if in some sense we can, would our ability to violate laws help us to reconcile determinism with free will?  But do we really feel that we have violated any laws every time we make a decision that we think is entirely up to us; that is to say when we think we have made a free decision and thereby we are fully morally responsible for what happened as a result of that decision?  ‘No, absolutely not!’ would be the usual answer.  If this is correct, then who cares even if we are able to violate laws in some sense?  I do believe there is a lot of truth in this simple, common-sense, observation, which will be shown by the end of this essay.  In the meantime, let us press on.  
To find out whether an agent (i.e. a human being or a rational being) can violate a law of nature in the sense of doing something to render a law false at some instant of time we must first know what laws are.  I can only briefly review some settled views on laws here, but such a review should suffice because what we need is not a particular view in all its details but some common features of laws that different views can agree to.  For example, it should not matter much for our purpose whether laws are regularities of some sort (one view) or relations among universals (another view) as long as they are made out to support counterfactuals.  
Let us go back to the two forms I mentioned earlier for laws, (4) and (5).  A law-statement is either of the form ‘all Fs are Gs’ or of the form ‘whenever X happens at t, Y happens at t*,’ where the first form quantifies over things as well as events while the second only events.  So, laws are at least regularities that are represented by statements of type (4) (or (5)).  Not all regularities are laws; lawlike regularities must be distinguishable from accidental ones in any adequate theory of laws.  One of the prominent features of laws that distinguish them from mere regularities is that laws support counterfactual statements and mere regularities do not.  To account for such a feature (and some others features) two theories are prominent in the literature: the (sophisticated) regularity theory and the universalist theory, the most widely discussed of the former belongs to Lewis's Best-system theory and the most widely discussed of the latter the Armstrong-Dretske theory.  Racially different ontologies separate the two theories.  Lewis and the rest of the regularitists think that laws are nothing but regularities that have some extra logical or epistemological features, while Armstrong and the rest of the universalists think that universals, besides things and/or events, exist in reality and laws are special relations among these universals (some think they are contingent while others think they are logically necessary relations).    
To distinguish a law from a mere regularity, the regularitists can be seen as using the formula:

(6) Law = Regularity + X, 

where X is a set of constraints of some sort that does not temper with the ontology.  Most such theories take X to consist of epistemological conditions (cf. Ayer 1963, Skyrms 1980, Urbach 1988), but Lewis's is different (cf, Lewis 1973, 71ff); the constraints in his theory are logical and pragmatic.  Here is a very brief sketch of Lewis's theory with a remark on its connection to his metaphysics.  Imagine the totality of all facts in our world, some of which are particular and some are general (i.e. regularities).  These facts are logically related: one fact entails another and are entailed by yet another; but some facts, specially some of the general facts, entail a lot more other facts than others.  Imagine an axiomatized system over all the facts of our world that is structured as a hierarchy of entailment: the more general facts that entail more other facts are towards the top and the less general that entail less are towards the bottom.  Now imagine many alternative such systems, some of which are very informative, meaning containing a lot of propositions for particular facts, while some are very simple, meaning containing mostly highly abstract and general propositions.  (As two extremes: the most informative system is the one that contains no truly general proposition but only propositions of particular facts; and the simplest system is one that contains one or a few propositions that are true of everything in our world.  From a practical point of view neither is useful to us.)  What we want is a system that has the best balance of simplicity and informativeness (which Lewis calls ‘strength’); and a law of nature is an axiom or a theorem of such a system.  This is the skeleton of the theory and we can see that the additional component X contains only logical elements - the axiomatization - and pragmatic elements - the standards for simplicity and strength.  
How can laws in the Best-system theory support counterfactuals?  Here is a brief, perhaps too brief, answer.  Logical systems of the above-mentioned kind exist in almost all logically possible worlds.  The possible worlds that are close to our world (the actual world) differ from it mostly in particular facts.  A possible world that contains a different number of people and/or trees and/or dogs and/or rivers, etc. is closer to us than one that contains dogs that design computers while humans only bark and fetch, and so on; and this latter world is closer to us than a world that contains birds that fly faster than the speed of light.  Intuitively we only regard the first kind of possible worlds as close to us, whereas those worlds in which dogs design computers or birds fly superluminally are likely to be worlds that do not obey the same set of laws in our world.  A difference of particular facts does not affect the structure of the axiomatic system.  Hence, our axiomatic system that give us our laws in our world is shared by all the possible worlds that are close to us.  That means the laws are also shared among such worlds.  And if so, what is made true by laws in our world is also true in those worlds; and that grounds the truth/falsity of our counterfactual statements.  Quite generally, if something that is not a M were to be a M, would it also be a R (given ‘all Ms are Rs’ expresses one of our laws)?  The answer is yes from the Lewis theory, because the possible world in which a non-M object in our world is a M-object is a world that differs from ours only in particular facts, and hence our law, all Ms are Rs, is also its law; and because of that all Ms are Rs in that world, and therefore something in our world would be a R if it were a M.  
We are now ready to examine Lewis's notorious claim that there is a sense in which one can violate a law of nature (cf. Lewis 1981).  Recall in that little argument Shiren gives at the beginning of this essay.  One of the key premises is that no one can violate a law of nature.  If one can, that argument is no longer sound, but that means van Iwagen's famous argument for incompatibilism is unsound because Shiren's argument is a simple instance of van Inwagen's.  It may seem obvious that in order to violate a law, one must be able to do something at time t to make the law fail at least at t or do something that causes an event at time t that makes the law fail at least at t.  Either way, to violate a law is to be able to do something that, directly or indirectly, causes an instance of a law's failure.  This, Lewis thinks, is impossible and I agree.  However, Lewis thinks that there is at least one other way that one can violate a law.  A law can be violated, in what Lewis regards as a ‘weak‘ sense, if one is able to do something such that the law would have failed if he did it.  The simple verbal formulation of the two senses - the strong and the weak - of the notion may not be ideal to convey the differences between them, but a careful reading of Lewis's article should yield the following implications.  
With the strong sense, the relation between one's action and the violation of a law is primarily a causal one: the action causes, directly or indirectly, the violation; and because of this causal relation, the fact about the action entails the fact about the violation.  With the weak sense, there is no causal relation between one's action and the violation, and yet the fact that one did the act entails that the law in question would have been violated.  If I am able to violate a law in the weak sense, it may still be impossible for me to do anything to ‘break‘ the law's grip on the processes of events, and yet there must be something such that if I did it this or that law must have been violated (though not at all by what I have done).  It also follows from the difference that all instances for the strong sense are those future directed causal sequences, or simultaneous events, such that if I am able to violate a law, my act is either the law-breaking event or the cause of some later law-breaking event.  All the instances for the weak sense are, on the contrary, past directed: my 'law-violating' acts indicate that the law in question must have been violated at some point in time before my act.  
What would be an example of the violation of a law in the weak sense?  There is at least one class of examples of which the following is quite typical.  Suppose it is a law that nothing move faster than the speed of light.  The law would have been violated if I did observe an object that moves faster than the speed of light.  What I did - observing that an object moves faster than the speed of light - does nothing to violate the law in question nor does it cause anything else to violate it, and yet if I did it the law would have been violated, because it is logically impossible for there to have been no breach of that law and yet I observed an superluminal object.   
What does this all mean?  Why is the violation of a law in the weak sense less severe than the one in the strong sense, and how could the former happen if the latter as Lewis says could not?  I am not sure I see a good answer on behalf of Lewis except perhaps the following.  Seeing a superluminal object is less radical an event than accelerating an object over the speed of light.  Therefore a possible world in which the former happens is less different (or closer) to our world than one in which the latter happens.  While we can never accept the latter world as close to us, we perhaps can accept the former as close enough, and yet the law in question is violated in that world.  
Does Lewis's conception help to rehabilitate free will and therefore support compatibilism?  And if it does then how?  Here is how I think it might work.  Laws and facts in the universalist ontology are creatures of different metaphysical species; but for a regularitist like Lewis, they are metaphysically the same.  They differ in the logical status in the axiomatized system.  When we look at possible worlds that are ordered according to their closeness to our world we usually find those worlds that differ only in singular facts but in no laws much closer than a world that differ in at least one law.  But this does not have to hold absolutely.  Ask yourself which of the following worlds differs from our world more.  In one world a few pieces of metal - they are true metal by their chemical composition - fails to conduct electricity for no reason at all but everything else is the same as in our world; and in the other world all metals conduct electricity and everything else is the same as in our world except creatures designing computers all physiologically like dogs and a popular type of pets are physiologically no different from humans.
What is the relevance of the above to solving the free will problem and compatibilism?  A complete and accurate answer to this question may be difficult to come by but the following case should suffice for a start.  Suppose determinism is true and it so happens that the last meal my mother ate before I was born was of such amount and composition that together with all the laws that govern whatever is relevant to my growth and development such that it is entailed that I would be sitting here writing this essay at this moment.  But just at this moment I could have decided of my own free will to stand up and walk to the kitchen and brew a cup of coffee, etc., in other words, I could have decided right now to take a break and taken it.  Suppose again that it has been found out which of those laws alluded above must have been violated in order for this to have happened; and it turns out that the most severe consequences of such a violation is that several other people would have had some events in their lives slighted altered, most of which are on the magnitude of standing a few feet away from what he or she actually stood at a certain moment or being indoors rather being outdoors which is where they actually were or …, the most dramatic being that one person missed one of her daily commuting train and had to take another train 15 minutes later.​[5]​  Now is the world in which I did take the break and thereby had several laws violated that bear no more than the above-mentioned consequences a closer possible world to our world than a world in which it is impossible for me to take the break and no law was violated?  Lewis can be interpreted as saying ‘yes‘ to this question, and it is in this sense Lewis's soft determinism helps compatibilism.  
Therefore, if laws of nature are what Lewis and company say they are and free actions as they are described in common sense are indispensable, then deterministic reality must be such that given any event at time t, another event at another time t* can only be determined up to a point by the laws.  

III. Why Davidson's action theory on its own cannot help
It is one thing to find a way to soften determinism and thereby rescue compatibilitism, it is quite another to supply an account of how free decisions and actions are supposed to arise in a (soft) deterministic world.  What do we typically do when we decide to carry out a act on our own choice?  Suppose I've been sitting at my desk and writing this essay for about an hour.  At this moment or by the end of this minute I believe it is quite possible that I will leave my desk and take a break or I will continue to write for another half hour.  I have general desires such as maintaining good health and achieving academic fame, and I have particular desires such as drink a cup of coffee and getting the section I'm writing now finished as soon as possible.  And I now believe that sitting at a desk for more than an hour is unhealthy and taking a coffee break will make me more productive when and if I resume writing after it; but I also understand that if I can get more work done in a shorter time I may be promoted faster and achieve fame sooner.  One minute has passed and I'm now in the kitchen starting to brew coffee.  My 'good health' and 'coffee break' desires are part of my reasons for taking the break by the end of that minute, and they are part of my reasons against continuing working.   And my 'fame' and 'early completion' desires are part of my reasons for continuing writing and against my taking the break.  Each supports one of the two, and resists the other, possible alternative actions I believe is open to me.  My beliefs about health and the rejuvenating effect of coffee breaks are likely to make me rank my break-taking desire higher and yet my understanding of what makes it faster to achieve fame works in the opposite direction.  If one asks me why I took the break, my answer may well be something like: even though the two sets of incompatible desires are equally strong (let's assume that is true), and I have beliefs that support one and resist the other, I in the end found the reason for health and rejuvenation more persuasive than the reason for rushing to fame and that made me decide to take a break and I took it.  My reasons not only explain my action, they also rationalize it.  The latter means that if I ever need to justify my taking that coffee break, to others and to myself, these will be the reasons.
This example gives an illustration of what a Davidsonian account of ‘acting intentionally’ amounts to when applied to a mundane episode of a philosopher's life (cf. Davidson 1980, sections I and III).  Can Davidson's account of action supply us with a sketch of a free action in a softly deterministic world?  And can such a sketch rescue compatibilism?  First, a sketch of intentional action according to Davidson.  To put it roughly, we say that desires (or some such pro-attitudes) and beliefs supply reasons for an action and are also what makes it intentional (providing it with justification).  They are states of an agent rather than actions themselves but they can nonetheless serve as the cause of her action. When I felt the need to take my coffee break I was certainly moved towards taking the break but feeling the need was not another action I took before I took my break.   Causal accounts provided by desires and beliefs (as reasons) differ from causal accounts among events in the physical world.  The key difference, among others, is that what connects reasons to its action is not the type of (causal) laws (or regularities) that one usually finds in the sciences, rather it has a distinct philosophical flavor.  One may find its origin in the Aristotelian practical syllogism, which says roughly that if you want something and knows for sure that doing A is the best way to get it then you should do A.  Considering my desire - either the general desire for good health or the particular desire for a cup of coffee - taking a break right then was, all things considered, the best way to satisfy it.  If I had deliberated along this line - it might be in a minimal sense of deliberation - and decided to take the break and took it, my act was caused by these considerations which give reasons for my action.  This simple, perhaps too simple an, illustration explains the following from Davidson.

A can do x intentionally (under the description d) means that if A has desires and beliefs that rationalize x (under d), then A does x. (Davidson 1980, p. 73)

  It is however quite possible, perhaps even natural, to think that my taking the coffee break as an act admits a different description - perhaps a description in terms of physics and biology alone - and when so described my act has a complete scientific explanation of physical causes.  It would actually be incredible if the event that is my taking the coffee break when described by the structural and dynamical properties of its components (my person as well as enough of my surroundings such as my desk, my study, the corridor leading to my kitchen and my kitchen, etc.) does not have a set of antecedent events similarly describable that is the sufficient cause of it.  We could ask if that is not true how that event can happen.  If no antecedent condition made my left arm move with the rest of my body to the kitchen, could my reasons have made it happen instead?  If this is true, shouldn't we then concede that the reason-explanation sketched above is redundant and superfluous?  Redundant? Perhaps, when it is properly understood; but superfluous? No, it is by no means superfluous.  
We can summarize roughly Davidson's view on the relationship between physical explanation and reason explanation of actions as follows.  Reason explanation is the only legitimate explanation of actions, partly because only reasons can make an action intelligible.  A physical explanation can not.  You can only make sense of my taking the coffee break as taking a break to relax my mind when you understood my reasons of taking it.  No amount of knowledge of the structural and dynamical properties of how the coffee-break event comes about can even begin to make sense of that.  If our world is deterministic, it must be deterministic in terms of physics, biology, etc.; and therefore the physical realm in this world must be causally closed in the sense that every event, including every action, must have a sufficient antecedent physical cause.  People seem to think that Davidson has taken this as a given, perhaps from shear intuition (that is why many people find his ‘anomalous monism’ a bit arbitrary and puzzling).  But I think there are good reasons for this position.  Besides the usual argument from supervenience, namely, all processes that lead from reasons to actions must supervene on physical processes, which has a great deal of intuitive force, the following may also argue for the position.  Suppose reasons as causes for actions are not redundant, namely, they fill in the gap that is left open by the supposed physical causal antecedents of an action.  Reasons and events together sufficiently cause the occurrence of some event that is the resulting act.  Are reasons ontologically of the same category as events?  Here then is the dilemma.  Reasons are either events or they are not.  If they are, they can serve the role events serve but they have to be causally determined by other antecedent events in a deterministic world; and if they are not, they are no longer tied down in the causal closure of the deterministic world but then they cannot fill the causal gap they are supposed to fill.  The first horn makes it impossible to see actions as free or carried out by free agents and the second horn makes free actions causally indeterminate.  Neither of these choices is acceptable and therefore reasons do not interfere with the physical/natural causal order of our world which is closed in itself; hence Davidson's anomalous monism.  
Because reasons as causes of actions are not in the causal order of nature but rather ‘riding‘ on it under intentional description, they may serve uncaused causal factors that ground free will.  When I explain that my taking the coffee break is caused by the right combination of my ‘health’ desire and ‘coffee’ desire and the appropriate belief states that constitute an attitudinal state (e.g. choosing, deciding, willing, etc.), it can be true that the state is not further caused by any other set of antecedent events.  Davidson relies on the subtle distinction between, for instance, ‘having worked at my desk for an hour caused my taking a coffee break’ and ‘having worked at my desk for an hour caused me to take a coffee break,' to drive this point home (see Davidson 1980, p.65 for his example and point).  It may well be true that having worked at my desk for an hour is physically sufficient for my coffee break, but it is quite possible that the first statement is true while the second false because the second statement suggests that I was forced into taking a break against my will while the first has no such connotation.  Hence, it is perfectly compatible to say that while my taking a coffee break is determined by prior physical events, my reasons and decision to take that break are entirely under my own control or up to me.  
The problem with Davidson's approach was realized by himself and remained today without an entirely satisfactory solution.  He thought there could never be any psycho-physical laws that connect reasons to actions, and without such laws his approach to compatibilism fails.  This is so because without laws it is impossible to determine which set of attitudinal conditions inevitably leads to which action; and without this, it is impossible in principle to tell which acts an agent does freely and which ones he does not freely do.  Suppose it is in general true that if an agent A has the right set of motives for and is in the right position to kill a person B, he intentionally kills B.  But we can't say in every case in which an agent is in A's position he intentionally kills a person like B, because it is entirely possible that in that particular case the person is killed by the agent incidentally; for instance, if the agent's hands jerked and his bullet hit a wall instead of the body of that person but the bullet bounced back from the wall and incidentally hit him and killed him.  If one wonders why we have to worry about such accidental conditions; why we cannot exclude them from the legitimate cases as we usually do with physical causal processes, here is a much simplified answer.  First of all, it is not clear why the accidental conditions disqualify an act as intentional.  Since the difference between a bullet's flying through the usual trajectory in killing a person and its flying through some unusual trajectory is a difference entirely in terms of physics, how can it be used to distinguish an intentional act from an unintentional one?  Second, if a mere physical difference can make an otherwise intentional act unintentional, the reason-action explanation is not self-contained or not deterministic.  The same set of reasons (or attitudinal conditions) does not always lead to the same action in a peculiar way: they always lead to the same act when described in physical terms, but in some cases the act counts as intentional - and thus a free act - but in other cases it counts as unintentional - and thus not a free act.  We can see that this problem for Davidson's approach in quite deep.    

IV. Objective chance and libertarianism
The next natural question to ask is: what if the world is indeterministic?  Would the problem of free will dissolve in that case?  Naïvely one may think that if strict determinism prohibits the existence of free will, and we have good evidence, for instance, from microphysics, that indeterminism is true, why don't we accept that and be done with this pseudo philosophical conundrum?  Before I proceed to discuss some issues in incompabilism, let me mention briefly an important point broached by Nagel.  Thomas Nagel observes at the beginning of his discussion on ‘freedom‘ (cf. Nagel 1986, ch. VII) that as soon as we ”view action from an objective or external standpoint (p. 110)” agency and therefore freedom that are so essential to the subjective standpoint seem to disappear.  By objective or external view, Nagel means a naturalist or scientific view.  Whether that is too narrow a construal of the ‘objective view’ of agency is another, and debatable, point; but if it is not, I believe Nagel is quite right.  It really matters little whether such a world is deterministic or not; if it contains nothing more than space-time and matter (and fields), and whatever happens in it is completely and exclusive attributable to their structures and dynamics, then it is difficult to see how the language of agency (which includes terms such as desires, beliefs, deliberations, actions, responsibility, guilt, resentment, admiration, etc.) could even be applicable.  This seems to suggest that the existence of free will is not in conflict with determinism but with naturalism.  It is not that a deterministic world prohibits anything in it to possess free agency but rather a naturalistic world has no place for it.  How could it help if such a world is indeterministic?  In naturalistic terms such a world have events in them that occur either with predictable probabilities or without predictable probabilities.  Either way, if acts are among such events, they could only happen by chance, and that is in no way compatible with the notion of free agency under which actions are supposed to be the result of reasons and decisions that agents freely engage and make.  
This observation has a lot of truth in it and I will say more about it later, but let us not loose sight of the following important point, which Nagel's observation threatens to obscure even though it does not contradict.  The point is this: if an action is caused by a sufficient set of antecedent physical or natural conditions, there is no room for free agency under the naturalistic description.  Any such agency is redundant and (perhaps) superfluous.  But if the set of antecedent physical conditions does not determine (is not sufficient) for the action (which is the minimal sense of indeterminism in the physical world), then free agency has a logical space in the world for its supposed job, namely, helping to bring about actions that we call free actions for which agents can be held morally responsible.  Such agency cannot be described in naturalistic terms, but since what can be so described does not form a causal closure, something else may exist to fill the gap.  
Now let us see in more detail why the natural order's being indeterministic, in whatever sense of indeterminism, provides no possible accommodation for free agency if it is to be taken as a member of that order.  The standard point one frequently sees in the literature argues essentially that if an action is produced by an agent indeterministically so that it is unproblematic to say that she could have done otherwise, then the action is produced randomly or by chance; and if so no account of free will as it is normally conceived is possible.  If making a free decision in the libertarian conception is not in its essence any different from making it by a flip of a coin or using a device that is controlled by some radioactive element, then there is no more freedom in that decision than in a decision in a deterministic world.  ‘Could have done otherwise,’ if made true by the mere fact that what is done ‘could have happened otherwise by chance,’ does nothing to rescue free will.  But such an argument is too quick and loose and the use of such notions as ‘shear randomness’ or ‘shear chance’ is too imprecise and extreme that it is often impossible to see how widely one can apply such arguments and still have confidence of their conclusions.
A more exact argument is given by Barry Loewer (cf. Loewer 1996, pp.103-106), with the conclusion that any genuinely probabilistic interpretation of quantum mechanics is as incompatible as determinism is with free will; and its argument runs parallel to van Inwagen's argument for incompatibilism we discussed briefly in the beginning of this essay.  Loewer's argument is more generally applicable than to a certain type of interpretations of quantum mechanics.  In fact it holds if there are objective chances and the laws of nature are complete (which implies that they assign objective probabilities to every event), regardless of how the world is ultimately constituted and whether there is a fundamental level to which everything else can be reduced.  Here is another, simpler and rougher, way of stating Loewer's argument.  It is Shiren's argument in world D (which is deterministic) transposed to a world ‘inD’, perhaps equally simple, that is (objectively) indeterministic.  Since Shiren's argument mimic van Inwagen's incompatibility argument, this one mimics Loewer's.  

If inD, my universe, is indeterministic, which seems obviously true, the law and some event E in the past entails that I moved in a certain direction B at time t with probability p, (and in direction B' at time t with probability p*, etc.)​[6]​.  If I had moved in a different direction B' at time t at my own will, I would have made 'moving in direction B at time t with p’ false in that the event would have had a different probability.  That implies I would have made either the law false or E otherwise (or E's probability different).  No one can change the past (or has control over an event that occur before his birth), so it is not possible for me to have made E otherwise (or changed its probability); therefore, I would have made the law false.  But no one can make a law of physics false; therefore, I could not have caused myself to move in direction B' at time t.  Hence, by reason against absurdity, if indeterminism is true in inD, I could not have moved at my own will in a different direction than I was determined to move. (see Loewer 1996, p.105 for his argument.)

For this argument, Loewer gives one principle of probabilistic causation.

(P) 	If e is a chancy event (i.e., at times prior to its occurrence there are objective chances of its occurring or not occurring), then if c causes e, it does so by altering the chance of e (at the time immediately after c) or by altering the chance of some event in a causal chain leading from c to e. (Loewer 1996, p. 104)

It should not come as a surprise that here a ‘Frankfurt-type’ objection can be raised against Loewer's argument; and because the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) is in some sense guaranteed in this (i.e., indeterminism) case, the objection may have a stronger bite.  Suppose when it came time (at t) to decide in which direction, B or B', to move, our pebble man, Shiren, decided to move along B' instead of B and did it, it is quite possible that this act of Shiren, which by stipulation is fully qualified as a free act, does nothing to upset the objective probability of his moving in direction B at t.  Just as in the original Frankfurt cases, namely, the agent happened to freely decide to do what is determined for him to do, Shiren happened to freely decide to carry out an act that the objective chance of the act allows it to happen.  I say that this case has a stronger bite than the cases for the deterministic world because even if Shiren decided to move in direction B instead of in direction B', he might still not have changed the chance of ‘Shiren moving in direction B at time t.’  In other words, he may be thought to have genuine options at time t as well as control over which options he pursues.  Of course, he can't choose to change the chance of his moving in direction B (or his moving in direction B') without running foul with Loewer's argument; and this means that given (P) Shiren can't be regarded as having ‘caused’ himself to move in direction B (or in direction B'); but this is a problem with Lewis's notion of probabilistic causation, which Loewer adopted for his argument.  
I shall not rehearse here the concerns and objections already known in the literature on probabilistic causation and probabilistic explanation.  Instead let me articulate a concern that is more relevant to our case of libertarian free agency.  When we have a fair coin we say that its chance of landing on heads is .5 in some idealized tossing experiment.  Whatever interpretation of this probability claim one takes - limiting frequency, propensity, or objective chance, etc. - one has to accept the following consequence of the claim.  In any finite sequence of random tosses, all combinations of heads and tails are possible with different probabilities.  It is possible, for instance, to have heads only (or tails only) in the sequence, although its probability gets smaller the longer the sequence becomes.  But as long as the sequence is finite, the probability of having all heads (or all tails) is never zero.  Of course, the longer the sequence the higher the probability that a half/half combination materializes, and yet that probability can never be one for a finite sequence.  The implication of this fact, which I repeat is independent of the interpretations of probability or chance, on our discussion of Loewer's argument is that the following scenario is possible, though unlikely.  Suppose there is an objective chance in world inD that Shiren moves in direction B whenever he decided to move in direction B (mutatis mutandis in direction B').  It may be true in inD, though somewhat unlikely, that Shiren moves in direction B whenever he decided to move in direction B (or in direction B') in his lifetime without violating the objective chance of this act of his.  In other words, unless we add an additional assumption, something that says: the actual world is the most probable world (or God could not have actualized a possible world that is not most probable), we could have regularities in our world that supports the libertarian claim for free will and yet not violating any indeterministic laws that govern reality.
One may think if we can compare the two events: (i) Shiren moving in direction B at t without Shiren making any decisions and (ii) Shiren moving in direction B at t with Shiren making a decision to so move, and we see a different outcome, then we can say that Shiren's decision has changed the chance of the event, 'Shiren moving in direction B at t.'  Unfortunately this is not true.  A difference of (a finite number of) singular outcomes does not necessitates a difference in chance.  Since there is a probability that Shiren ends up moving in direction B' at t in (i), whatever happened in (ii) - Shiren ends up moving in direction B or B' with a fully deliberated decision - wouldn't necessarily have changed the chance of that event in (i).  Hence, if the above consideration holds, (P) is not true and Loewer's argument against incompatibilism with objective chance is not sound.  
However, one may still resist the above point and think that it is necessary for an action by choice, such as having voluntarily raised my left arm five minutes ago, to be a free action only if its chance would have been changed had I chosen otherwise, such as not having raised my left arm then.  Why does it sound odd to say that if I had chosen to raised my left arm five minutes ago by choice, the chance of my raising my left arm then without my deciding to do so could have been the same?    Here is what I think the right response.
Think again of our character in inD, Shiren; but this time he is just like an undecayed uranium atom except he has a fully equipped mind of average intelligence by our standard.  His behavior is fully describable by quantum mechanics, which Shiren can easily grasp.  Suppose for a while in his life, Shiren had no knowledge of quantum mechanics and thought that whether he decays into another element is up to him, albeit he only has probabilistic success.  Then he learned quantum mechanics and was fully convinced of its truth.  Could he still regard when and where he decays as a result of his free choice?  He might reason as follows.  According to quantum mechanics, my chance of decaying at 3 p.m. today is .25.  I may decide to decay at 3 or I may decide not to but whatever I decide to do it must agree with the chance of .25.​[7]​ Hence, I might be able to say after 3 p.m. that I could have decided otherwise and made myself decayed (or not decayed, depending on what actually transpired at 3 p.m. that day), and yet that decision would have agreed with the .25 chance (or the .75 chance) of the action.  But wait, that doesn't quite make sense, does it?  If he is truly free to make his own decision as to whether to decay or not at 3:00; if it is truly ‘up to him’ whether he makes himself decay or not, his action cannot be confined by the probability, can it?  If to be consistent with the chance he ought to have decayed at 3:00, and yet it is entirely up to him what happens, he ought to have been able to decide not to decay and remained undecayed.  Otherwise how can he say he has free will and whether he decays or not at 3:00 is truly up to him?  He does not have free will after all!  
As this highly simplified and yet entirely sufficient example shows, to have free will requires the ability to violate laws of nature in some sense in an indeterministic world just as it is required in a deterministic world; the only difference is that in the latter case the laws that a free agent must be able to violate are probabilistic causal laws.  
To summarize: while I think (P) is too strong a principle for probabilistic causality in general, it may well hold for free agency.  We do not seem to have good reason to believe that a freely chosen act could have caused the occurrence of an event without changing its chance.  

Loewer's argument, though in fact general as I explained above, was directed at a specific proposal for libertarian free will by Nozick and Kane on the basis of the indeterminacy in quantum measurement (cf. Nozick 1981; Kane 1996).  But unbeknownst to either of them is a similar idea entertained by Russell (cf. Russell 1948, ch. V) which is more general and perhaps more promising.  Let us take a look at this idea before we move on to entertain the more recent proposals.  
Russell is discussing the physiology of sensation and volition when he asks the following question​[8]​: suppose we have a case of a soldier hearing a command and then voluntarily following it by acting accordingly.  The sound of the command goes into the soldier's ears and is transmitted via the afferent to the brain.  And this happens on the side of sensation.  In the other direction, instructions for muscle movement that constitutes the soldier's carrying out the command arise in the brain and are then transmitted via the efferent to the appropriate muscle groups on the soldier's body.  And this happens on the side of volition.  Is it all physics, chemistry, and physiology from the input of the sound pattern to the muscle movement?  Or are there in between ‘mental’ or ‘non-physical’ intermediaries to which such terms as ‘deliberation,’ ‘decision,’ and ‘willing’ refer to?  If the causal chain from sense-organs to muscle groups is entirely deterministic in terms of natural sciences, Russell continues, then those mental terms either refer to some physical states in the chain or are meaningless symbols.  But the world is indeterminstic according to quantum mechanics.  That means given the input at the sense-organ end, the output at the muscle end is not entirely determined.  It implies the possibility, although not much more than that, that some extra, perhaps mental, factors exist in the chain to sufficiently bring out the output at the muscle end.  Russell writes: “It might be that, without infringing the laws of physics, intelligence could make improbable things happen, as Maxwell's demon would have defeated the second law of thermo-dynamics by opening the trap-door to fast-moving particles and closing it to slow-moving ones.” (p. 55, my italics)  After acknowledging that it is difficult to imagine the negligible uncertainties at the macroscopic level, which is the level of our organs, he continues: 

Nevertheless, for those who are anxious to assert the power of mind over matter it is possible to find a loophole.  It may be maintained that one characteristic of living matter is a condition of unstable equilibrium, and that this condition is most highly developed in the brains of human beings.  A rock weighing many tons might be so delicately poised on the summit of a conical mountain that a child could, by a gentle push, send it thundering down into any of the valleys below; here a tiny difference in the initial impulse makes an enormous difference to the result.  Perhaps in the brain the unstable equilibrium is so delicate that the difference between two possible occurrences in one atom suffices to produce macroscopic differences in the movements of muscles.  And since, according to quantum physics, there are no physical laws to determine which several possible transitions a given atom will undergo, we may imagine that, in a brain, the choice between possible transitions is determined by a psychological cause called “volition”.(pp.55-56, my italics)

The last sentence is what I think precisely qualifies Russell's as the predecessor of the Nozick-Kane view. 
Given what we now know after discussing Loewer's argument, several things in Russell's idea can be quickly disposed of.  What is said in the first quote from Russell we have above either does not work or is misleading.  If a consciousness outside of the realm of physics, as modeled by Mazwell's demon, is to bring about an effect in an indeterministic process, such as the supposed transition from a decision in the brain to the muscle movement that counts as carrying out the decision, then it must violate a (probabilistic) law of physics by making that muscle movement having a chance different from what it would be when no consciousness were to bring it about.  This must be so if what we said in the previous several paragraphs is correct.  The use of Maxwell's demon is misleading because his use of his intelligence actually ‘breaks’ the second law of thermodynamics.  If Russell meant to say that the demon does not break the (microscopic) law of kinetic gas, he is right; but then the demon is no longer needed.  The statistical law of kinetic gas describes to us the probabilistic behavior of gas molecules as if there is a Maxwell's demon.  
The image of the demon or the child messing with a physical system governed by chancy laws is however very suggestive.  If what the demon or child represents is within the natural order, we go back to square one: what the child did with that gentle push is then not distinguishable from a similarly push by a gentle breeze or a momentary fluctuation of still air or …, which we know can't serve as the metaphor of volition.  The same is true with the demon; what it does would not be distinguishable from the results of some rare but possible patterns of molecule collisions such that all the fast-moving ones collect on one side of the container and all the slow-moving ones on the other side.  However, the image of the demon ought to suggest that whatever brings about the dramatic, macroscopic result from a microscopic (or almost microscopic) difference is outside the natural order, and therefore it does not obey the laws of nature.  It brings about an effect that either wouldn't occur or would occur with a different chance if it were absent.  




V. Quantum measurement and libertarian free will
We have so far carefully gone through some of the central issues concerning free will; the results are mostly negative.  If what I've argued above is right, those leads that some have thought promising are dead ends.  The only available option is a dualist approach of some sort.  There are at least two kinds of dualism: substance dualism takes the mind to be of a different substance from matter, while property dualism postulates only one substance; the mind refers to a set of properties that is distinct from and nonreducible to the material properties of the same substance.  I do not care which dualism one embraces so long as one has better answers to question such as
(7) how such activities as making decisions or willing come out in the account as ones by genuinely free agents;
(8) how they may violate laws that govern material properties and 
yet no such violations seem to have been detected so far; 
and more specifically, 
(9) how they are related to quantum measurement.  

What follows is only a rough sketch of a minimally dualist approach.  My aim here is not to convince but to clearly articulate the approach so that if I am successful it should appear worth defending.
First an interpretation of quantum mechanics and the metaphysical view it entails.  Our world is fundamentally quantum mechanical, which means all physical processes, microscopic or macroscopic, are completely described by quantum theory.  However, the world so described cannot be entirely physical (or natural) because there is a crucial element in quantum theory that the theory itself has no account for.  I'm here referring to a component in the notion of quantum measurement that is indispensable for but unaccountable by any quantum theory.  This component is consciousness whose role in quantum measurement is that without it no definite values of any observable can be obtained.  In this interpretation I take that consciousness exists sui generis and shows up in the quantum mechanical description as something outside the physical realm that makes quantum measurements possible (the Wigner interpretation, which Loewer entertained and dismissed (Loewer 1996, pp 106ff), is such an interpretation).  
Quantum mechanical theory basically comprises two parts, one part has as its center piece the Schrödinger equation which deterministically takes one state of any system to any other state if the Hamitonian is known of the system and the relevant parts of its environment.  The other part that concerns quantum measurements deals with a transition from a quantum description of nature in which superposed states are widespread to a classical description where superposition does not exist.  Quantum mechanics has no law that accounts for such a transition and it does not seem that such a law could ever be discovered without fundamentally changing the quantum worldview.​[9]​  The first part when applied to an isolated system regarding one of its observables, such as its location, not only does not allow us in principle to predict (as we are all familiar) where it is at a certain time, but also prevents us in principle from predicting (and this is often missed) where it may possibly be with what probability at a certain time no matter with what other physical systems it comes into contact.  What the first part allows us to predict is a conditional: it only allows us to predict where a system may possibly be with what probability, if the system is measured, namely, coming into contact with another system of a certain type and the result of that contact being registered in a conscious mind.  Whether and when the ‘if-clause‘ becomes true is completely beyond the first part.  In other words, the first part does not allow us in principle to predict when a measurement, any measurement, occurs even if full information is given about the antecedent states of the system in question and its environment because it cannot predict if and when a definite result is recorded in a conscious mind.  (We of course assume that there are at least some cases of quantum measurement in which it was really up to the observers whether to pay attention and record the results in their heads.)  The second part of quantum mechanics does not help at all in this respect: it does tell us what must happen, namely a ‘collapse’ of the state vector, for there to be a measurement result, and in addition what rule of probability distribution the system must obey when it is measured (this is known as the Born rule).  But again, it does not tell us when a conscious mind engages to complete any such collapses.  Therefore, the 'if-clause' given above is also beyond quantum mechanics and thus beyond physics.
Let me compare the predicament of quantum mechanics to that of any possible classical theory of nature to further illustrate the point above.  One might think that the only difference between classical mechanics and quantum mechanics on predicting in principle when some measurement results obtain and what they are is no more than this: classical mechanics allows us to predict in principle when a given measurement takes place and what value obtains and quantum mechanics allows us to predict in principle when a given measurement takes place and what set of possible values obtain with what probability for each.  But this is not so.  In the classical ontology, a measurement is no more than a kind of physical interaction, whose details are in principle determined by classical mechanics.  In the quantum ontology, a measurement is also a kind of physical interaction, but the interaction doesn't count unless the consciousness as part of it engages and records.  Otherwise, the superposition continues through the interaction and no definite value is obtainable.  Given the existence of genuine free will, no physical theory, classical or quantum, can predict when an observer will engage and record; but since classical mechanics does not need consciousness for a measurement result, it doesn't matter; while quantum mechanics needs it essentially (to collapse the superposition), it matters greatly.  Hence, quantum mechanics says much less than what many assumes it is capable of saying: using it we can never in principle tell when any given measurement takes place.  
Consciousness irreducibly exists, and with such an ontological status it is required in the measurement part of quantum mechanical theory but the law that govern its structure and dynamics, if there is a law, is entirely beyond it.  Therefore, quantum mechanics is complete in that it leaves nothing in the natural world unaccounted for, and yet it is incomplete in that its account of nature is not self-contained.  It needs a notion of consciousness that is beyond the natural order to give a complete account of nature.
Second, how quantum measurement relates to free will.  It is true of quantum theory that with whatever system we couple the system to be measured, no record of measurement emerges until it is registered in a conscious mind.  A large system may dramatically reduce the probabilities of other possible values of the to-be-measured observable, but it can never eliminate them.  Or, to put it more dramatically but no less truly, no physical system by itself, however large, can collapse a state vector; however, it can if it contains a conscious mind.​[10]​  By ‘containing’ I do not mean ‘having as a part;’ rather it means loosely ‘being closely associated with.’  It is in this sense a person contains a conscious mind.  Obviously, if free actions are to be instances associated with quantum measurement, they cannot look like those typical examples of quantum measurement, such as a lab assistant manning a measurement device off which pointer values are read periodically.  The assistant may have exercised her free will in observing a particular measurement result, but that has no connection to what makes it that result.  However, there are quantum measurements of other sorts.   
To see what sort of quantum measurement may be suitable, let us go back to the Nozick-Kane model.  Nozick took what happens in a quantum measurement (as quantum theory tells us) as a model for the deliberation and decision of a free agent.  A person before a decision, i.e. while deliberating on alternative actions by weighing reasons for each of them, is analogous to being in a state before measurement, she is in a superposition of weighed mental states.  More precise, the mental state may be written in the style of quantum mechanics thus: 

(10)	 = a|decided to do A> + b|decided to do B> + c|decided to do C> +…

where quantities such as |a|2 and |b|2 are the weighs for the corresponding alternative states.  And the decision ‘collapses’ the superposition () and let the mind settle on one of the alternatives (e.g. |decided to do C>), and that eventually causes the action in the normal way.  Albert and Loewer pointed out that the model cannot work if making a decision is literally taken as an act of collapsing a state like (10).  Kane's improved model came to the rescue.  Between the state of being uncertain of which alternative actions to carry out and the state of initiating one of the actions, Kane inserts ‘the effort of willing,’ which admits degrees.  Now, the superposed states comprise either ‘striving to do A,’ ‘striving to do B,’ etc., or ‘strongly striving to do A,’ ‘weakly striving to do A,’ etc.  Hence, the superposed mental state ought to be in the form of:

(11)	 = a|striving to do A> + b|striving to do B> + c|striving to do C> +…

And the agent's decision ‘collapses’ the superposition () and let the mind settle on one of the alternatives (e.g. |striving to do C>), and that eventually causes the agent to make a choice which in turn leads to an action.  But wait; what does this mean?  Here is a plausible model for its meaning.   in (11) is a state of an agent that is fully describable and governed by the first part of quantum mechanics; and when she makes a decision that collapses  into one of its eigenstates, a measurement takes place inside her head, where the act of decision comes from the consciousness of the agent (which in this model is dual to the physical).  And only when an act of this kind takes place can a genuine transition from the superposed state to a non-superposed state occur in her head.  The relevance of Russell's metaphorical image of the child tipping over the boulder into one of the valleys is that a mental state ready to be collapsed in a decision must be a state of instability, a state that is ready to undertake what is known in the physics literature as a spontaneous symmetry breaking.  The necessity for such a state to be the kind of ready state before a measurement collapse by a consciousness is that this is the most plausible state in a physical system whose transformation to another state does not require any energy-momentum transfer.  In other words, although the decisions do break the laws that assign objective chances to events, they do not also break any conservation laws (###).  This appears to be the only way that the Nozick-Kane model can make sense if free agency in decision-making is to be seriously modeled on quantum measurement.
One should note that in this model all decisions, choices, willing, etc. are quantum measurements but not all measurements are such activities.  Although all genuine measurements in which definite values of measured observables are obtained involve consciousness, not all such consciousness involve decisions or willing.  When an assistant notices and records a value from a particle accelerator, her consciousness is engaged and the value only obtains when it is recorded in her consciousness, according to this model; but she doesn't have to made a special decision to observe the dial on the machine.  However, it implies that all quantum measurements happen in someone's head or some such equivalent systems.  The model requires that a collapse happens only in a system in which instabilities that are ready for a spontaneous symmetry breaking are present and a consciousness that is capable of breaking the symmetry is also present.  
One should also note that if this, essentially Wignerian, interpretation of quantum mechanics is true, there cannot be physical or event causes for such activities as willing and decision-making because nothing that collapses state vectors belongs to the quantum physical realm.  Hence, the idea that volition has no sufficient physical causes is a necessary outcome of this interpretation.  Or in other words, the libertarian notion of free will is a natural consequence of this conception of quantum reality. 
What I said so far agrees, but also goes far beyond, the Wignerian interpretation of quantum mechanics that Loewer entertained (see Loewer 1996, pp. 106-108).  Loewer dismissed this approach (he calls it the Wignerian mechanics) because it must break quantum mechanical laws and yet no violation of such laws has ever been observed nor do we have any reason to believe such violation will be observed in the future.  I will deal with this point next.  This model also agrees to a high degree with some approaches in agent causation theory, in particular Clarke's model (cf. Clarke 1995, also O'Conner 1995).  As a matter of fact this essay is partly motivated by a desire to see how far our understanding of indeterminism and the agent causation solution to the free will problem could come together.  I am now persuaded by the above that an approach of agent causation can be worked out such that it receives ample support from our understanding of indeterminism; but to work this out in detail must be left for another occasion.
Loewer raised the objection after his discussion of Wignerian mechanics that no quantum measurements of any known type have ever been observed to violate the Born rule.  In fact the Born rule is amply confirmed, if any laws or rules of quantum physics are so confirmed, in a variety of quantum measurement experiments.  Hence, how can Wignerian mechanics or the Nozick-Kane model as sketched above, which breaks the Born rule, has any likelihood of being true?  Here is how we should think about the situation.  The ordinary type of quantum measurements, such as making observations in a physics lab of the readings of a Geiger counter, do not need any decisions per se to effect the collapse of the observed system's vector state; what is required there is only a registration in a conscious mind.  That none of that type of actions violate the Born rule is entirely consistent with the possibility that decision-involving measurements violate the Born rule.  If one asks why we haven't observed any such violations, the answer is not hard to find: it is very difficult to observe them if there are such violations simply because there has never been quantum mechanical estimates of probabilities of this sort.  Try to imagine actually coming up with a quantum mechanically accurate formulation of (10) or (11); imagine what it may take to formulate the state vector of a person's ‘striving to overcome the temptation of downing a whole bottle of OX cognac,’ not to mention constructing a device to detect the deviation of the probability of that person's choosing that state.  Hence, the lack-of-evidence argument and its variations are entirely inapplicable in this case.​[11]​
Having said that, we must realize that from a theoretical perspective a violation of Born's rule is not as serious a violation as of some other laws.  Decision-making measurements only violate the probability distributions, they do not change the set of possible alternatives quantum mechanics says that an agent may have before she makes the relevant choice.  It would have been a more detectable violation if this latter must also be relinquished to make the Nozick-Kane model work.  
If quantum mechanics cannot in principle provide any predictions of when a given observable of a system assumes a definite value because it all depends on when a measurement takes place whose result is registered in a conscious mind and this latter is entirely beyond quantum mechanics, how is it possible, or is it possible at all, in principle to predict, for example, when I will make a decision of a certain type?  If it is not, wouldn't that be a puzzling result?  I do often know in normal circumstances when, at least approximately, I make choices that lead to my actions, don't I?  Could the Nozick-Kane model offer a solution?  What we need is a quantum theory that allow us to accurately predict the type of states in people's head that are the counterparts of Russell's metaphor.  These are states of instability, or more specifically, states of spontaneous symmetry breaking.  There are mathematically precise descriptions for such systems in such states, and there is no reason to think that quantum mechanics cannot in principle be made to handle the task.  It is therefore not too far fetched to think that a quantum mechanical description of a person can be made such that it (together with the Schrödinger equation when the Hamiltonian is known) can reveal to us when and where a mental state may occur that is of the kind in which she can execute a decision-type collapse that constitute a measurement.  Whether or not the measurement takes place can not be determined by such a description and the Schrödinger equation, of course, but that is entirely consistent with what we usually know, such as I know when I will make a decision of a certain sort or I know when my friend Kelly will make a decision of a certain sort.  Whether mine or Kelly's decision is made then is not up to Kelly or me, respectively, or anybody else nor is it up to quantum mechanics; it's up to me or her (which if our model is right breaks the Born rule or some such later variations).
Among the contending interpretations in the recent literature beside the above, we have Bohmian mechanics and the GRW interpretation (that are most relevant).  If Bohmian mechanics is true, the quantum world is deterministic, albeit non-local, after all; hence we are back to square one with respect to free will.  If the GRW interpretation is true, the quantum world is indeed indeterministic; but it is so in the most hostile way to free will.  If the world is GRW, whatever could have been otherwise was possible in a completely random way that is no more accommodating to free actions than strict determinism.  Loewer's argument is most applicable if the world is GRW.  

VI. Conclusion
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^1	  For the sake of simplicity, let's assume there is no elastic collision between any of the objects.  It is obviously implied in this conception that the intelligent pebble has no way of using his mental capacities to alter his behavior in D because the physics of a pebble does not allow such intervention by the intellect.  But if one asks how the physics of the pebble allows for the emergence of an ordinary intelligence, I would say it doesn't, and the carrier of this intelligence is most likely something non-physical.  
^2	  The reader might have noticed that this argument closely follows from the general one given by van Inwagen (1983); see p. 70.
^3	  This part of the consistency constraints simply says something roughly as this: given it is possible to travel back in time, if you imagine a journey back to your early years during which you made all the bed-wetting incidents in your childhood disappear, then you have imagined something that could never happen.  Similarly all imagined time travels in which any past event is changed must remain merely 'imagined' trips.  
^4	  What is said here is certainly correct with the regularity accounts of laws.  I think it is also correct with the universalist, but I am less certain about it.  If it is not, I shall stay within the regularity accounts.  
^5	  It's assumed quite plausibly that none of these events are caused by my taking the break or by any events that are directly caused by that.
^6	  One should also assume such constraints as the sum of all probabilities for all possible directions must add up to unity.  
^7	  This statement must make sense if inD is a world in which objective chances prevail.  The probabilistic causation operating in it make sense of single case probability.  
^8	  What I shall say in the following should only be construed as in Russell's spirit.  I want to bring what he said up to date but still remain true to his main ideas. It should be easy to check Russell's origin in his widely available book.  
^9	  For instance, if one thinks that making quantum mechanics fully compatible with special relativity whose result is the quantum field theory might have provided the missing law for measurement or made the problem of measurement disappear, then one is mistaken.
^10	  In fact, one does not necessarily need a large system to carry out a measurement; a microscopic system suffices if it contains a conscious mind.  Quantum measurements involve large systems as measuring devices in our world simply because only large mammals harbor conscious minds.  
^11	  One must be mindful of the following point.  If quantum mechanics allows us in principle to predict with an objective chance when a lab assistant will record a result and when she will not, then our model may entail that that chance may be violated since the lab assistant could freely decide to record or not to record a result in her mind.  But quantum mechanics can do no such things; what it does is to allow us in principle to predict what the objective chances of a certain values of the measured system are if the lab assistant observes, with or without a decision of her own.  Quantum mechanics also allows us to predict in principle, via a quantum mechanical description of what's going on in the assistant's head, with what objective chance she will decide to observe or decide not to observe.  With her free will, she can change that chance and therefore violate Born's rule; but this violation, as explained above, cannot be easily observed.  Therefore, one should not expect that one can in principle observe any violations of Born's rule in any kind of quantum measurement experiments that are now possible in physics labs.  
